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621 
MENTAL DISORDERS AND THE “SYSTEM OF 
JUDGMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY” 
ANITA L. ALLEN∗ 
I. 
“Any long period of insanity or deep compulsive obsession ruins a life.”1 
Justice for Hedgehogs is a big book about one big thing: the truth of “living 
well and being good.”2  Dworkin maintains that “people each have a general, 
foundational responsibility to live well, to make something of their lives, and 
that living well is a matter of making appropriate decisions over one’s life.”3  
Acting responsibly means acting in a principled way.  It is a virtue.4  People 
who might otherwise be responsible are compromised by self-interest, by being 
pulled in two directions at once (moral “schizophrenia”), and by failing to 
apply applicable principles across all categories of reflection (moral 
“compartmentalization”).5   
People who might otherwise act responsibly are also compromised by the 
conditions popularly and imprecisely referred to as mental disease, mental 
illness, mental disorder, being crazy, and insanity.  The percentage of people in 
the United States assigned one of these labels is strikingly large.6  It is 
surprising that moral philosophers do not have more to say – descriptively, 
analytically, and normatively – about the moral lives and responsibilities of 
persons affected by mental conditions.  For his part, Dworkin states that 
serious, persistent mental disorder can undercut responsibility and “ruins a 
life.”7 
Like most philosophers of moral and ethical responsibility, Dworkin 
concentrates on “normal” adult men and women.  However, in Dworkin’s 
 
∗ Deputy Dean and Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009 
manuscript at 143, on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
2 Id. (manuscript at 138). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. (manuscript at 67). 
5 Id. (manuscript at 68). 
6 See Press Release, National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Illness Exacts Heavy 
Toll, Beginning in Youth (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/science-
news/2005/mental-illness-exacts-heavy-toll-beginning-in-youth.shtml. 
7 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 143). 
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chapter entitled “Free Will and Responsibility,” Dworkin seems to take a 
special interest in psychiatric pathology.8  Dworkin draws numerous contrasts 
between normal adults and people who fall into other categories, including 
children, idiots (Dworkin’s term), the brain damaged, the insane, and 
psychopaths.9  
Dworkin places children and persons with what he calls “serious mental 
illnesses” in an exceptional category, laboring over the reasons for doing so – 
reasons it falls to his readers to assess.10  Indeed, his interpretation of children 
and persons affected by mental illness as lacking certain creative epistemic and 
regulative capacities, as opposed to being driven by outside hydraulic forces, 
plays a key role in his effort to show that determinism is not a threat to 
regarding normal adults as responsible.11  Ultimately, readers have to ask 
whether Dworkin’s understandings of mental conditions, responsibility in the 
context of mental conditions, and the distinction between (1) lacking a 
epistemic and regulative capacity and (2) being driven by causal forces from 
the outside are clear, correct, and complete.  I begin that task here. 
II. 
“We do not regard someone as suffering from mental disease if his cognitive 
and regulative capacities fall only somewhat short of what we take to be 
normal.  They must be low indeed.”12 
My concern for philosophical accounts of responsibility in the context of 
mental conditions is prompted by three things.  First, government studies 
suggest that mental conditions are exceedingly prevalent.13  Second, with 
increased openness about mental health, we are learning that mental conditions 
strike people from all walks of life, including practicing lawyers and judges 
who shoulder major responsibilities for securing legal services and legal 
justice.  Third, as personal memoirs chronicling mental conditions reveal, 
intelligent people affected by mental conditions have inner lives in which 
concerns about personal virtue, moral capacity, moral compliance, moral 
accountability, and moral repair can loom large.  Philosophers have tended to 
stereotype and short-change the ethical and moral experiences of people 
affected by mild and serious mental conditions.   
A federally funded study by the National Institute of Mental Health 
(“NIMH”) suggested that at least twenty-six percent of the general population 
 
8 Id. (manuscript at 137-60). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. (manuscript at 146). 
12 Id. (manuscript at 159). 
13 Dworkin’s “we” ordinary people, contrasted with “they,” the persons with mental 
conditions, refers to something of a chimera.  Lots of “us” are “them.” 
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suffers from a diagnosable mental disorder each year.14  The twenty-six 
percent figure was conservative, however.  It was based on a survey of 
English-speaking American households and did not poll homeless, 
hospitalized, or institutionalized people.15  Nor did it count “some rare and 
complex psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism.”16  The 
NIMH figures corroborate a controversial report of the United States Surgeon 
General, which placed the annual rate of mental illness in America at 
approximately twenty percent.17   
The group affected by mental disorders includes the high functioning 
professionals we rely on.  Our lawyers, judges, physicians, and politicians all 
experience mental illnesses.  Although, as mental health memoir writer 
Elizabeth Wurtzel points out, “The measure of our mindfulness, the touchstone 
for sanity in this society, is our level of productivity, our attention to 
responsibility, our ability to plain and simple hold down a job.”18  Major 
responsibilities shouldered in ordinary life merely place limits on “how much 
rope” high functioning people with mental conditions have to hang 
themselves.19 
Among lawyers and judges, mental conditions, including drug and alcohol 
dependency, are commonplace.20  Sometimes, lawyers and judges with mental 
problems run afoul of the very law they are sworn to uphold.  Consider 
Stephen Thompson, the once-respected New Jersey judge whose post-
traumatic stress disorder was a factor in his decision to have sex with a young 
boy and collect child pornography;21 or Sol Wachter, the Chief Judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals who became a stalker after the medication he took 
induced bipolar disorder.22 
Depression is also common among lawyers.  Katharine Graham wrote about 
her brilliant husband Philip, whose suicide associated with bipolar depression 
occurred following a remarkable career as a Harvard Law School graduate, 
Supreme Court law clerk, and controlling owner of Newsweek, the Washington 
 
14 Press Release, National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 6. 
15 See id. 
16 Id. 
17 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 46 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/ 
H/S/_/nnbbhs.pdf. 
18 ELIZABETH WURTZEL, PROZAC NATION: YOUNG AND DEPRESSED IN AMERICA 48 (First 
Replica Books 1999) (1994). 
19 Id. 
20 See Rick B. Allen, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265, 
265-66 (1997). 
21 See Toni Callas, Jury Split on Judge’s Insanity Defense, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1, 
2005, at B01.  
22 See Diana Jean Schemo, A Prison Term of 15 Months for Wachtler, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
10, 1993, at B1; Judge Not, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1, 1997, 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199707/judge-not. 
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Post, and numerous radio and television stations.23  Schizophrenia is also not 
unheard of among successful lawyers.  Professor Elyn Saks has written about 
her exemplary achievements, including attending law school, practicing law, 
and earning tenure on a law faculty, while struggling with schizophrenia.24   
We cannot summarily exclude people with mental problems out of the 
universe of moral agents, reducing them to the status of rocks, trees, animals, 
and infants, whether to denigrate them or to protect them from moral and legal 
wrath, as Michael Moore long ago tried to do in a well-meaning response to 
Thomas Szasz.25  Nor can we include the group on the false assumption that 
their moral lives are precisely like the paradigmatic moral lives of the 
epistemically-sound and well-regulated people never personally touched by a 
mental condition.  The published memoirs, diaries, and correspondences of 
people who have experienced serious mental illness reveal rich inner ethical 
lives and social lives that combine impressive moral successes with 
devastating moral failures. 
III. 
“We believe that living well requires that we create not just a chronology but 
a narrative that weaves together values of character, loyalties ambitions, 
desires, tastes and ideals.  No one creates a narrative of perfect integrity: we . 
. . act out of character sometimes.”26  
The internal lives of persons with mental conditions are often active 
narratives of moral and ethical engagement, full of questions and discernment.  
We know this because we have the benefit of the psychiatric memoir literature, 
whose contributors range from the sublime William Styron27 to former 
Massachusetts First Lady, Kitty Dukakis.28 
Who am I?  Am I the person who self-improves and self-destructs, helps and 
harms others?  
• “I have two identities.  Essentially, one is good, one is bad. . . .  I 
really don’t like hurting people.  If I inadvertently do, it’s always 
 
23 See generally KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY (1997). 
24 See generally ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD (2007). 
25 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 155-
81 (1984) (arguing that mental illness is not a myth and thus that the search for the line 
between the “bad and the sick” must continue).  
26 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 154-55). 
27 See generally WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (1990). 
28 See generally KITTY DUKAKIS WITH JANE SCOVELL, NOW YOU KNOW (1990). 
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followed by huge tidal waves of guilt.  And even if by chance it’s on 
purpose, it always makes me feel awful, so I do it as little as I can.”29 
• “Both my manias and depressions had violent sides to them.  
Violence, especially if you are a woman, is not something spoken 
about with ease.  Being wildly out of control – physically assaultive, 
screaming insanely at the top of one’s lungs, running frenetically with 
no purpose or limit, or impulsively trying to leap from cars – is 
frightening to others and unspeakably terrifying to oneself.”30 
Are my actions, desires, preferences, and habits a matter of pathology or 
personality?  Am I in control or is mania in control?   
• “And my sex life . . . well . . .  I was a single person, and I got into 
what I guess we call free love.  I certainly didn’t know it then, but, 
looking back, I see this as another part of the mania.”31 
• “I told her about my drug and alcohol abuse, sleepless nights, poor 
class attendance, my inability to focus, reckless driving, starving 
myself, and hyperactivity. . . .  That began our four-year 
therapist/client relationship. . . .  The mania also transformed me into 
an extremely outgoing and sociable character.  Fueled by drugs and 
alcohol, I constantly socialized and partied, avoiding the possibility of 
sliding into a dreaded depression.”32 
Am I accountable?  What should I do to make amends?  How can I know I 
am well enough to make meaningful apologies? 
• “I fear I am like some deep-sea animal, who cannot rise quickly to the 
surface without excess decompression.  In any event my rise has been 
slow. . . .  Now I wish to say that I have thought through the situation. 
. . .  1) I wish to apologize fully.  2) My behavior was inhumane and 
unpardonable.”33 
Modern philosophers often seem to assume all people with serious mental 
disorders lack ethical and moral capacity and because of it, moral or legal 
 
29 DANIELLE STEEL, HIS BRIGHT LIGHT: THE STORY OF NICK TRAINA 93 (1998) (quoting 
musician Nick Traina). 
30 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND 120 (1995). 
31 PATTY DUKE WITH GLORIA HOCHMAN, A BRILLIANT MADNESS 19 (paperback ed. 
1993). 
32 ANDY BEHRMAN, ELECTROBOY 20, 22 (2002). 
33 GRAHAM, supra note 23, at 303 (quoting Philip Graham). 
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culpability.34  But philosophers rarely bother to define precisely who counts as 
having the sort of mental condition that undercuts moral capacity.  Dworkin 
doubts that “psychopaths,” “addicts,” and “compulsives” “act” at all.  And 
even when philosophers acknowledge ethical and moral capacity among 
people affected by mental conditions, they then fail to incorporate the varieties 
of ethical and moral engagement common to mental disorder into their 
accounts of normative life.  
At any given moment, America’s mentally troubled are invisibly integrated 
into the moral fabric of society, whether philosophers choose to deal with that 
fact or not.  They function as participants in the ethics of care, concern, and 
practical responsibility.  It is worth considering whether the fact that Dworkin 
is writing in an era of heightened awareness of the pervasiveness of mental 
disorders and intellectual disabilities makes a difference in how he 
conceptualizes judgmental responsibility.  A society with a formative agenda 
of cultivating character excellence cannot simply ignore the existence of 
mental disorders.   
IV. 
“We ordinary people have no reason to think that a crazy person’s decisions 
have any less – or any more – causal independence or originality than our 
own.”35  
People with mental conditions are stock characters in moral philosophy.36  
They are dramatis personae with bit roles.  They are brought in as specimens to 
make a point, not to be part of the conversation.37  Philosophers typically 
introduce people with mental conditions at the point in laying down a moral 
theory when they believe they must acknowledge that there are exceptions to 
the otherwise proud and universal ascription of moral responsibility to adult 
members of the human family.  
Does Justice for Hedgehogs follow this regrettable pattern?  People affected 
by mental conditions first appear in Dworkin’s chapter entitled “Free Will and 
Responsibility,” in which Dworkin focuses on the proper ascription of a 
dimension of living well and being good that he refers to as “judgmental 
responsibility.”38  Judgmental responsibility is an ethical and moral capacity: 
“Someone has judgmental responsibility for an act if it is appropriate to hold 
 
34 See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH 
WANTING 45 (1984). 
35 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 151). 
36 See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 34, at 157 (“We also find it plausible to judge that 
nonhuman animals, infants, and those who are severely handicapped mentally are not 
responsible at all.”). 
37 See id. 
38 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 137-60). 
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him responsible for it: to blame him or praise him for it.”39  Judgmental 
responsibility is, it seems, part of the “freedom, reason and/or feeling” package 
philosophers traditionally refer to as “moral agency.”  Judgmental 
responsibility is something Dworkin wants badly to ascribe to as many people 
as possible to dignify and motivate them; but he implicitly assumes certain 
marginal populations stand in the way.  So he puzzles over the “exceptions” he 
refers to as “idiots” and “psychopaths.”40 
How can anyone – sane or insane – be responsible for their actions if those 
actions are not “free” but “determined” by forces beyond their control?   
The discipline of moral philosophy has established a drill.  Before a 
philosopher can ascribe moral and ethical responsibility to individuals, he or 
she must first prove that either individuals possess freedom of will or that 
freedom of will does not matter.  Accordingly, in a big book about living well, 
Dworkin would be expected to tackle the classic “free will versus 
determinism” problem before advancing a conception of ethical and moral 
responsibility.  And so he does.   
Now, determinism is a scientific theory holding that every “decision[], 
reflective as well as unreflective, is fully determined by processes and events 
that precede it and lie outside the control of the decider.”41  Epiphenomenalism 
is the scientific claim that the “causal chain that ends in movements of nerve 
and muscle” does not include decisions at all.42  Decisions, which may appear 
to a person as prompting action, are “epiphenomena” of external processes and 
events.43   
Some philosophers (the “incompatibilists”44) have argued that moral 
responsibility ascriptions would be false or pointless if either determinism or 
epiphenomenalism were true.  Dworkin offers an end run around the threat to 
responsibility seemingly posed by determinism and its teammate, 
epiphenomenalism, with his own unique compatibilism. 
Dworkin argues that neither determinism nor epiphenomenalism is a 
personal responsibility showstopper.45  We can meaningfully ascribe 
judgmental responsibility to normal adult men and women and to many youths 
and people with mental disorders, even if determinism and epiphenomenalism 
are scientifically true.  This argument relies on his trademark interpretative 
turn. 
For Dworkin, judgmental responsibility is an “interpretative concept” whose 
point and value is relevant to its understanding and application.46  Embracing 
 
39 Id. (manuscript at 139).  
40 Id. (manuscript at 150-53). 
41 Id. (manuscript at 137). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (manuscript at 141). 
45 See id. (manuscript at 137-60). 
46 Id. (manuscript at 139). 
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judgmental responsibility is a better ethical fit with the overall fabric of our 
lives than rejecting it on account of scientific determinism or 
epiphenomenalism.  A “responsibility system” exists in our lives, and we 
“must try to justify as well as we can.”47   
The responsibility system ascribes judgmental responsibility to a person not 
just in case the person is scientifically free, but if he or she (1) has a minimal 
ability to form true beliefs about the world, other people’s mental states, and 
the likely consequences of what they do; and (2) the ability to make decisions 
that fit “the agent’s normative personality: his desires, preferences, 
convictions, attachments, loyalties and self image.”48  These are epistemic and 
regulative capacities, respectively. 
We do hold people accountable and we also make moral judgments about 
right and wrong, Dworkin maintains.  We have an “internal sense of deliberate 
action”;49 we have a sense of pushing and being pushed and we make a 
distinction between the two, he says.50  Scientific possibilities provide no basis 
for an individual to cease his or her ethical quest to live well, which includes 
asking, “Am I responsible for what I decided to do?”  Dworkin’s ethical 
subject views herself as a decider, a person with reasons for acting and a 
person who views others as having reasons for acting.51   
Dworkin’s attack on determinism includes an argument that people cannot 
coherently believe that scientific perspectives like determinism undercut 
responsibility.  Such a belief’s “annihilating power is catholic across 
reasons.”52  If determinism were true and meant we have no judgmental 
responsibility then “we are all – hurricanes and people – just carried on 
nature’s sea.”53  The best fitting conception of responsibility does not allow 
scientific possibilities to undercut the practice of praising or blaming ourselves 
and others.  Determinism and epiphenomenalism are technically consistent 
with, but psychologically in tension with, the general practice of giving reasons 
and the specific ethical practice of giving reasons – “the responsibility system” 
which “[o]ur culture has handed us.”54   
With the threats of determinism and epiphenomenalism out of the way, 
Dworkin forges ahead to elaborate judgmental responsibility.  When is it 
appropriate for someone to judge his or her own behavior critically (as a matter 
of personal ethics) and for others to judge him or her that way (as a matter of 
moral evaluation)?  Judgmental responsibility is appropriately ascribed when a 
 
47 Id. (manuscript at 143). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Note that people with mental illness have this internal sense of deliberate action, too. 
51 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 145). 
52 Id. (manuscript at 141). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (manuscript at 154). 
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combination of capacities is obtained – a minimal ability to form true beliefs, 
understand consequences and act reliably in accord with personality.   
An understanding of judgmental responsibility may have implications for 
law, but clearly, Dworkin’s “judgmental responsibility” is not the same thing 
as ordinary legal responsibility.  The law sometimes, for policy reasons, 
assigns legal responsibility to natural persons who are not judgmentally 
responsible or fully judgmentally responsible simply because they have caused 
harm.  For example, a person utterly and permanently deluded as to reality by 
schizophrenia can he held liable for intentional torts as if they were perfectly 
sane.55  Moreover, the law, for policy reasons, assigns legal responsibility to 
entities who, as non-natural persons, cannot be ascribed judgmental 
responsibility at all.  For example, a court, under the doctrine of vicarious 
liability, held that a corporation serving in the role of general contractor on a 
construction project can be legally responsible for harms caused by the 
employee of an undercapitalized sub-contractor.56  Judgmental responsibility, 
like moral agency, makes human beings special and confers importance and 
dignity.  Sadly, not all human beings have judgmental responsibility.  Their 
importance stems from other morally relevant potential, traits, and 
relationships.   
V. 
“We are not responsible when someone pushes us or manipulates our mind . . . 
.  But we are also not responsible when we are small children or seriously 
mentally ill.”57 
Challenged by their disorders and illnesses, persons afflicted with mental 
conditions struggle to conform to basic societal expectations of right as 
opposed to wrong, virtue as opposed to vice, good as opposed to evil, and 
justice as opposed to injustice.  They may be especially unlikely to succeed.  
How should persons with mental illness respond to moral failure in their 
personal lives; ethical failure in their professional lives?  And conversely, what 
special pride ought they take in their successes?  
Do persons with mental conditions possess judgmental responsibility?  I 
believe most do, most of the time, and that only a very few of the people to 
whom DSM-IV diagnoses could be applied do not at all.58  
Dworkin’s account of judgmental responsibility, his “adverbial” ethics, 
shifts toward the narrative/internal/creative and away from the 
 
55 See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961). 
56 See Becker v. Interstate Props., 569 F.2d 1203, 1209, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1977).  
57 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 150). 
58 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, at xxi-xxiii (4th ed. 1994). 
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executive/causal/external/hydraulic.59  This is good news for moral 
philosophers looking for a normative framework within which to explain why, 
and in what way, people with mental illnesses are moral agents.  People with 
symptoms of bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, dissociative identity disorder, schizophrenia, and the like are creative 
actors, narrative builders.  They are intelligent; they are not robots.  They are 
not the people Dworkin indelicately terms “idiots” who do not know that guns 
kill.60  Yet the narratives of responsibility shaping Dworkin’s interpretation of 
responsible actors are the narratives of mental wellness not mental disorder or 
illness.   
Mental disorders are not a marginal phenomenon, meriting a parenthetical or 
a footnote in ethics books.  There can be no adequate theory of moral agency 
or of “judgmental responsibility” that omits a perspective on the moral and 
ethical capacities and responsibilities of persons affected by mental disorders.  
When should we blame?  What is an excuse?  What, if anything, do people 
affected by mental illness owe the people they harm?  What special ethical and 
moral obligations of prudence, of warning, of advance directives, if any, 
pertain to people with mentally disorders?  Philosophers have plenty of work 
to do on such questions before getting to questions of ideal legal responsibility, 
such as whether people with mental disorders are liable for intentional torts, 
negligence, crimes, and commercial breaches.  Philosophers of value should 
spend more time than most traditionally have spent fleshing out the moral and 
ethical responsibilities of people affected by mental disorders.  
High-functioning people who are ill with bipolar disorder, major unipolar 
depression, schizophrenia, and other DSM-IV mental illnesses have rich and 
difficult moral lives.  Often educated, well-brought up, and well-employed, 
people with mental illnesses typically know right from wrong.  Yet sometimes 
they do the wrong thing.  They hit, lie, cheat, brag, extort, bribe, abuse, and 
molest.  Many of their most hurtful, damaging, and illegal acts seem to be a 
direct result of illnesses that unleash negative impulses and distort judgment.  
But bad behavior is not the only problem.  Persons affected by mental illness 
may suffer from low self-esteem; they may inappropriately judge and criticize 
themselves.  
The biographies and autobiographies of persons diagnosed with mental 
illness reveal individuals who sometimes succeed at meeting their 
responsibilities and who sometimes fail.  When they fail, mentally troubled 
people of all ages and many walks of life experience deep, even debilitating, 
guilt, shame, and remorse.  Actress Patty Duke has written that after losing 
control of emotions in front of her family, she often felt overcome with 
pathological degrees of shame: “Now I had to run to the bathroom and try to 
kill myself because that was the only way to save face.”61  For their misdeeds, 
 
59 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 124). 
60 Id. (manuscript at 141). 
61 DUKE, supra note 31, at 236. 
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they apologize, pay compensation, and submit to shunning and criminal 
punishment.  Thus, people with mental illness combine active, rich inner moral 
lives with public accountability within the “responsibility system.”   
People with mental illness can be excessively “good,” religious, or exacting 
– to a fault.  For example, the insane delusions of Margery Kempe led her to 
reject worldliness and adopt a religious life.62  Similarly, Foucault tells the 
story of Glenadel, a “polite” man who begged to be chained down to prevent 
him from carrying out an impulse to murder his sister-in-law.63  Sigmund 
Freud observed that some of his manic-depressive patients blamed themselves 
and refused to blame themselves to a pathological extent.64  Freud diagnosed 
what are now called “mood” or “affective” disorders in some of his patients 
and was fascinated by their implications for morality.  “It is a most remarkable 
experience to see morality,” he wrote in 1933, “which is supposed to have been 
given to us by God and thus deeply implanted in us, functioning [in these 
patients] as a periodic phenomenon.”65  Freud observed that during periods of 
normalcy, his patients were morally balanced.66  They recognized right and 
wrong and could generally make accurate, socially acceptable judgments.67  
However “melancholy” or depressed patients were, their over-severe super-
egos tended to heap undeserved blame on themselves.68  Freud’s ego-driven 
“maniac” or manic patients were amoral, tending toward uninhibited 
gratification of immoral desires.69 
VI. 
“A toddler or idiot or madman makes decisions and makes them, perhaps, 
with some sense of responsibility for them.  But he should reject judgmental 
responsibility for those decisions later, when he grows or if he recovers, and 
the rest of us should reject them now.  We think – and the toddler, at least, will 
later come to think – that it would be right not to count those decisions in 
deciding how well he has lived.  If we accept the creative principle as the 
ethical basis for our responsibility system we can await the latest discoveries 
 
62 ROY PORTER, MADNESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 173-77 (2002). 
63 MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1974-1975, at 
143-45 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans., Picador 2003) (1999). 
64 See SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 60-61 
(James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1933). 
65 Id. at 61 (alterations in original). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
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about the electro-dynamics of our brains with boundless curiosity but no 
terror.”70  
Suppose a well-educated and gainfully employed adult storms into a friend’s 
apartment during an episode of bipolar rage, smashes a framed work of art to 
the floor, and assaults the friend with a shard of glass.  Should she blame her 
own behavior critically and should others judge her that way?  Following 
Dworkin, the offender is judgmentally responsible if she has the capacity to 
recognize truth, comprehend consequences, and act in accord with normative 
personality.  The adult who has had a bipolar rage attack is someone who 
probably satisfies the epistemic prong of judgmental responsibility; but not, on 
the occasion of the attack, the regulative prong.   
We can imagine, though, that overwhelmingly, the person does act in accord 
with normative personality sufficient for judgmental responsibility’s regulative 
prong.  She could be like Kay Jamison, the successful bipolar medical school 
professor.  The interplay of inner life and public accountability is movingly 
displayed on the pages of Dr. Jamison’s autobiographical best-seller, An 
Unquiet Mind.71  Jamison writes of madness and recovery, aided by supportive 
friends, family, and lithium.  A professor at Johns Hopkins University, Jamison 
described how suicide attempts are “deeply bruising” to the people who care 
about you.72  Concerns about hurting others mix easily in her writing with 
concerns about self-concept and identity.  Notably, Jamison wrote of how 
bruising it is for the mentally ill to live with the “discrepancies between what 
one is, what one is brought up to believe is the right way of behaving toward 
others, and what actually happens” while ill.73   
We must therefore reject understanding judgmental responsibility as a 
matter of development or degree.  Judgmental responsibility has another axis.  
Further complicating this inquiry is the reality that it is also a distinctly 
episodic phenomenon.  It is a set of traits that can come and go.  The set can 
come and go rapidly and frequently, as it might for the people psychiatrists 
diagnose as having rapid-cycling bipolar disorders and/or intermittent 
explosive disorder.  Or it can come and go occasionally, as it might for people 
whose affective disorders erupt once or twice in their lives and are otherwise 
well-controlled by lifestyle, medication, and therapy.   
Failing to recognize the distinct episodic quality of ethical and moral 
capacity (and the brands of moral engagement it precipitates precisely because 
it is episodic) is a mistake.  The mistake prompts philosophers to class adult 
persons affected by mental illness with children.  But children’s internal 
narratives and mental illness-affected adults’ ethical narratives are worlds 
apart.  Children have yet to experience reliable epistemic and regulative 
 
70 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 157). 
71 See generally JAMISON, supra note 30. 
72 Id. at 120. 
73 Id. at 121. 
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competence; and to have complex work, family, and public service lives built-
up around them.  For an adult, the lack of epistemic and/or regulative capacity 
is often a matter of “losing it” and being saddled with all the practical 
consequences of falling short.  
VII. 
“Would I think myself responsible, in retrospect, if I had the kind of incapacity 
the defendant’s act revealed?  That is the spirit of the attractive thought, 
‘There but for the grace of God go I.’”74 
The ideal moral agent will avoid lying, cheating, stealing, promise breaking, 
unfairness, injustice, abuse, and violence.  Histories of psychiatry reveal that 
Westerners used to consider mental illness a spiritual defect or a per se defect 
of character.75  It is neither.  Mental health professionals recognize that poor 
moral and ethical judgment may be a result of very real, treatable abnormalities 
of brain chemistry and function.76  Mental health interventions are enablers of 
better ethical living and moral goodness.  The availability of such interventions 
means that neither brief nor extended bouts of mental illness inevitably ruin 
lives.  
How should persons with mental illness respond to moral failure in their 
personal lives; ethical failure in their professional lives?  And conversely, what 
special pride ought they take in their successes?  
Consider Jeremy (not his real name), a man over fifty with two master’s 
degrees.  He supports his three teenage children by teaching full time in a 
public elementary school in New York City and selling his own high-quality 
original artwork.  A father, teacher, and artist, Jeremy’s life is hardly a 
“ruined” life. 
Yet Jeremy is seriously mentally ill.  Jeremy lives with memories of a father 
who repeatedly beat him and raped his sisters in earshot of a mother 
immobilized by morbid obesity.  Since childhood, he has cycled through bouts 
of catatonic sadness and energetic, selfish pleasure-seeking.  Jeremy has been 
violently aggressive; more often suicidal.  Once, he flung himself through a 
third-story window and spent a month in the hospital.  He is well when in 
therapy and medicated with a cocktail of mood-stabilizers, anticonvulsants, 
antidepressants, and second-generation antipsychotics.  He prefers the tremors, 
sexual dysfunction, and other side effects of medication to the emotional 
extremes he experiences without them. 
 
74 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 159). 
75 See LILIAN R. FURST, BEFORE FREUD: HYSTERIA AND HYPNOSIS IN LATER NINETEENTH-
CENTURY PSYCHIATRIC CASES 17-33 (2008). 
76 See Kenneth Tardiff, Mental Illness: Assessment and Management of Violent Patients, 
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE, PEACE, CONFLICT 413, 416 (Lester Kurtz ed., 1999). 
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Mental illness can lead people to feel awful and to do awful things.  
Contrary to popular stereotypes, however, the sober mentally ill population is 
not a special threat to the community.  Yet, poor judgment, irritability, abuse, 
and violence are hallmarks of major mental disturbances.  Even though an 
individual knows what is morally right and has a firm foundation of moral 
education, it may be impossible to do the right thing when mental illness 
strikes.  Moreover, mental illness can cause a person to act out of character.  
Because the mentally ill often wish to be morally compliant members of their 
communities, their ethical failings can be a source of considerable regret and 
shame.   
When assessing his responsibility for his outrageous assaults and property 
damage, Jeremy cannot say, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.”  He must 
say, “Despite the grace of God, here I am.”  He must assess his own epistemic 
and regulative capacities.  He must wonder if he is in control or if he is a 
tumbleweed.  Jeremy believes his regulative capacities are impaired and that it 
is a medical problem prescription drugs can relieve.  But he also believes he is 
driven, willy-nilly, to behave badly by genetic inheritance from his 
schizophrenic father and childhood abuse.  The internal dialogue combines the 
creative and the hydraulic.   
VIII. 
“[Y]ou must treat the success of your own life as of intrinsic and objective 
importance.”77 
People with mental illness are often written out of the ethics game or given a 
bum script.  We should acknowledge their actual roles and their potential.  If 
everyone is crazy, is anyone to blame?  Moralism is always a risk when 
dealing with illness, but I believe praise and blame very often apply to the 
conduct and characters of people with mental illnesses.  We must encourage 
greater respect for the moral potential and contributions of people with mental 
illness, through identifying realms of moral responsibility and legal liability 
that properly – and improperly – apply to them.   
It is not always clear what greater respect means.  What modes of 
accountability are fitting?  What is a morally committed person obligated to do 
to address the fallout of hurt feelings and injury caused by his or her mental 
illnesses?  Should society hold individuals morally accountable when chronic 
or short-term mental disability distorts their judgments about right and wrong?  
People who suffer from mental illness typically look and act normally.  We 
may be disinclined to shelter them from blame the way we shelter the mentally 
retarded.  The Supreme Court has held that criminal offenders with IQs below 
seventy may not be put to death.78  Yet contemporary United States laws 
 
77 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 162). 
78 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
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sternly impose criminal and civil liability on high-functioning mentally ill 
persons all the time. 
For what are you responsible when you are perfectly intelligent and yet 
illness makes you irresponsible?  After a manic rage or a messy suicide 
attempt, what do the high-functioning mentally ill owe the people they may 
have offended, harmed, or worried?  Dworkin suggests people with mental 
illness owe nothing for the wrong they do when ill.  Yet we can imagine 
alternative schools of thought.  A “full accountability” school would say: the 
mentally ill owe complete apologies and compensation for the wrong they do, 
to the extent that they recover from mental illness and are capable of 
performing moral repair.  They should face the same punishments and liability 
as everyone else.  The “partial accountability” school says: the mentally ill 
have an obligation to try to seek and follow medical advice, but otherwise only 
to offer brief factual explanations of illness-caused injuries.  They should not 
be subject to the same criminal and civil burdens as ordinary people.  Both 
schools of thought purport to recognize the humanity of the mentally ill in 
different ways.  The full accountability approach does so by treating the ill no 
differently from others who injure; the partial accountability approach by 
acknowledging that the ill suffer bona fide disabilities, which are no fault of 
their own.  
The insane can be good, the sane bad.  No one can help some degree of 
moral failure.  With or without fault, the mentally ill sometimes cannot meet 
basic conventional expectations of moral behavior.  There is much that science 
and psychology may one day tell us about the relationship between the brain, 
mental health, and behavior.  Perhaps one day we will blame less, and do a 
much better job of helping the mentally ill control antisocial behaviors.  
Being at risk of ethical and moral failure on account of mental conditions 
entails special responsibilities of self-care and harm prevention.  A person 
prone to bipolar mania, for example, is obligated to take reasonable steps to 
prevent bouts of acute illness, and, if something akin to the “partial 
accountability” approach is the right one, acknowledge hurtful behavior.  A 
twenty-six percent prevalence rate of mental illness calls for access to moral 
and ethical capacity building through access to effective mental health 
services.  Without access to good physicians, medications, and hospitals, 
people with mental illness cannot do what they should.  A just society will 
assist people adversely affected by mental illness, both as a matter of sound 
public health and as a matter of sound ethical policy.  
Many people are periodically and intermittently just too sick to do the right 
thing.  Anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia get in the way 
of conforming to basic standards of moral conduct.  Challenged by their 
illness, persons afflicted with mental illness struggle to conform to basic 
societal expectations of right as opposed to wrong, virtue as opposed to vice, 
good as opposed to evil, and justice as opposed to injustice.  They may be 
especially unlikely to succeed.  
  
636 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:621 
 
Society has done little to help them.  Moral educators have not worked 
under the assumption of widespread mental disorders and diseases in the past.  
Yet the data suggest that a high percentage of the bright children and teens, to 
whom we are trying to teach values in high school and college, may be 
struggling with problems of mood and judgment.79  Mental health 
professionals today recognize that poor moral judgment may be a result of very 
real, treatable abnormalities of brain chemistry and function.80  Mental illness 
is too common among the general population to overlook or to marginalize the 
issues of moral compliance, moral accountability, and societal obligation.  
With access to therapy, medical care, and social services, even people with 
serious mental illnesses, like Jeremy, can hope to survive to live what are on 
balance ethically and morally worthy lives. 
IX. 
“Did the accused lack one or the other of the pertinent capacities to such a 
degree that it is inappropriate to ascribe responsibility to him?”81 
The law books are full enough of stories of men and women who live 
basically normal lives, but who, at some point or intermittently, damage 
property, engage in vice, or hurt other people through negligence or aggression 
because they are mentally ill.  People whom mental illness does not affect 
make mistakes of reason.  But mentally ill persons, even the very intelligent 
and well intended, cannot always recognize which choices are decent and best.  
Their intermittent incapacities neither reduce their human dignity nor relieve 
them as thinking, creative, narrative-building subjects from the responsibility 
system that often ignores their special challenges and experiences. 
“Normal” people commonly ignore the demands of conscience and 
conventional morality.  People experiencing acute mental illness may fail to 
hear the genuine demands of conscience or see the value in conventional 
morality.  Florid mania and psychotic delusions can lead to bad, even 
dangerous and deadly, choices.  Depression, anxiety, and obsessions can lead 
to mistakes of action and inaction. 
• Anthony Costello, who suffered from bipolar disorder, was fired from 
his job at Johns Hopkins University.  He went to work one day 
wielding a hockey stick, threatening violence.  Because he was 
 
79 See Richard A. Friedman, Uncovering an Epidemic: Screening for Mental Illness in 
Teens, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2717, 2717 (2006) (“[H]alf of all serious adult psychiatric 
illnesses – including major depression, anxiety disorders, and substance abuse – start by 14 
years of age, and three fourths of them are present by 25 years of age.”). 
80 See Tardiff, supra note 76, at 416. 
81 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 158). 
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terminated for misconduct, Costello was denied the usual 
unemployment benefits.82   
• Depressed after his wife’s death from lupus, Ronald Gossage began 
taking the medications Xanax and Prozac.  He shot two women in 
their home, denying any memory of the event.  He was convicted of 
“assault under extreme emotional disturbance” and sentenced to six 
years in prison.83   
• A forty-one year old “John Doe” with schizophrenia was evicted from 
his rented apartment, after skipping his medication and becoming 
psychotic.  While psychotic, he spray-painted the stove, radiator, and 
windowsills of his apartment and then damaged a neighbor’s front 
door with a hammer.84 
• Margie Wodarz left the scene of one automobile collision, only to 
cause another more serious collision a few minutes later.  Witnesses 
said her behavior at the scene of the accidents was “bizarre.”  Wodarz 
said she “wigged out.”  She explained that her family had “a history of 
mental problems” and conjectured that she “just freaked out.”85 
• Erma Veith was driving down the road when suddenly it seemed to 
her that God took hold of the steering wheel.  She stepped on the gas 
when she saw a truck coming in her direction.  She believed she could 
fly like Batman.  The driver of the truck was seriously injured and 
sued.  A psychiatrist testified that “Veith was suffering from 
‘schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, acute’” at the time of the 
collision.86 
These things can happen.  You can hurt people while mentally ill.  Or, you 
may simply hurt yourself, sleeping too much to the point of utter debilitation.  
You may abuse drugs or alcohol and waste your money.  While ill, you may 
commit the ultimate act of self-injury: suicide. 
• Sandra Kaiser, a fourteen-year-old who had been diagnosed with 
conduct disorders, developmental disorders, and aggression, 
committed suicide by jumping off a bridge into oncoming traffic.  She 
 
82 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Bd. of Labor, 761 A.2d 350, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).  
83 Gossage v. Roberts, 904 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995). 
84 Stuyvesant Assocs. v. Doe, 534 A.2d 448, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987). 
85 Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 637 (Ct. App. 1996). 
86 Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Wis. 1970). 
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had recently gotten an abortion, and her boyfriend had announced he 
had impregnated another girl.87  
• A woman, called G.D. in court records, took a lethal dose of the 
prescription medication Elavil, obtained with the help of her 
stepfather, through a physician who did not know her.  Her husband 
sued the stepfather and the doctor, alleging both that the physician’s 
negligence and the stepfather’s history of abusing his stepdaughter 
were the true causes of the suicide.88   
Most people, whether or not they have a mental disorder, are capable of 
moral feeling and caring about themselves.  A few people with mental illness 
are incapable of caring much about their futures or other people.  These few 
seem cut off from ordinary human feeling and emotion, which is so key to 
genuine moral commitments and action.  They seem oddly indifferent to moral 
concerns even though they mouth the vocabulary of morality.  As Dworkin 
points out, if United States criminal defendants are found to have a “mental 
disease” they may be able to use an insanity defense to avoid the harshest 
punishments.89  In the past, being found to have had knowledge of right and 
wrong could mean a person with a mental illness would be denied an insanity 
defense. 
Patricia Tempest coolly drowned her five-year-old in the bathtub and then 
sat down to watch a movie, ate a banana, and waited until her husband came 
home.90  Patricia was convicted of first degree murder, despite the testimony of 
a psychiatrist that she was suffering from “chronic schizophrenia, acute type” 
at the time of the homicide.91  She was not insane in the eyes of the law, 
however.  She knew right from wrong.  When asked why she drowned her son, 
she said he was “too demanding” and “got on her nerves.”92  A friendless 
recluse, she did not want her outgoing son and husband in her life anymore.93  
She told the police that she had first thought of killing her son days earlier.94  
This admission was evidence that the killing was an intentional, premeditated 
act.  She also told the police that she had apologized to her son for causing his 
death.95  Her apology to the victim counted as legally good evidence that she 
was not insane at the time of the crime.96  She knew exactly what she was 
 
87 Eidson v. Reprod. Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621, 622-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
88 R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1994).  
89 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 158-59). 
90 Commonwealth v. Tempest, 437 A.2d 952, 953 (Pa. 1981).  
91 Id. at 954. 
92 Id. at 953. 
93 Id. at 954. 
94 Id. at 955. 
95 Id. at 954. 
96 Id.  
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doing.  Patricia’s own words did her in with the legal system.  But the words 
may have been just words, robotic, no real moral performance of 
accountability and repair at all.   
Mental illness can lead to moral compartmentalization.  Heinous crimes are 
sometimes committed by people who are seeking, in their own minds, to act in 
the best interest of others – certain select others.  David Paul Martin, for 
example, had a history of poor judgment and poor impulse control.97  One 
afternoon in 1991, David and his second wife, Connie Lynn Martin, had a 
screaming match.98  Connie screamed that she would like to see David in jail, 
and David screamed at Connie for imposing too many chores on their daughter 
Brandy.99  David then knocked Connie down and choked her to death.100  After 
the killing, David took a shower, gave Brandy and her brother some cash, and 
then turned on the television.101  The police arrived and arrested David, who 
was indicted for first-degree murder.102  Psychiatrists who performed a court-
ordered mental examination told the trial court that in their professional 
opinion, David was suffering from a mental illness or defect at the time of the 
crime – specifically major depression and a dissociative disorder.103  David 
was subsequently found guilty of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter 
and sentenced to five years in jail.104   
I would not deny that some few people are too sick for ethics and morality 
and cannot be understood as subject to the responsibility system at all.  I agree 
with Dworkin that “mental illness may savage either or both of the judgmental 
capacities in anyone.”105  Like him, I worry whether the law is consistent or 
correct in how it regards people with losses of epistemic or regulative capacity, 
let alone irresistible impulses or knowledge of right and wrong.106   
Because Dworkin’s agenda is preserving the notion of freedom for the sake 
of the responsibility system as it applies to normal (“we ordinary”) people, he 
stresses that “if we accept that mentally ill criminals should be excused 
because they are not responsible,” we need not agree with pessimistic 
incompatibilists that “for that reason . . . no one is ever responsible because 
everyone is actually in the same position” of being steered by external 
hydraulic forces.107  Dworkin would excuse the criminally accused when they 
“lack one or the other of the pertinent capacities to such a degree that it is 
 
97 See State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tenn. 1997). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 22. 
104 Id. at 21. 
105 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 156). 
106 See id. 
107 Id. (manuscript at 150). 
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inappropriate to ascribe responsibility.”108  He endorses capacity-based 
approaches (both epistemic and regulative) to the assignment of legal liability 
for serious crime.  He asserts that American jurisdictions that now limit the 
insanity defense to persons with “mental disease[s]” as on the right track, to 
the extent that mental diseases are associated with diminished epistemic and 
regulative capacities.109  
Tennessee, the state that convicted wife-strangler David Paul Martin of 
manslaughter rather than first-degree murder, has subsequently made it harder 
for defendants claiming mental illness to benefit from an insanity defense, by 
establishing a tough burden of proof.  I conclude with a footnote from the 
court’s opinion in Martin’s appeal describing the change:  
At the time of the offense, insanity was a defense to prosecution if “at the 
time of such conduct, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the person 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
person’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.”  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1991).  If the evidence raised a 
reasonable doubt as to the person’s sanity, the burden of proof fell to the 
state to establish sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Jackson, 890 
S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1994).  Effective July 1, 1995, the law was amended 
to provide that the defendant must prove, by “clear and convincing 
evidence,” that “as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, [he or 
she] was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of [his or her] 
acts.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (Supp. 1995).110 
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